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Statement of the Nature of the 
Disposition by the Lower Court 
Relief Sought on Appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
Le') al Argument 
Point I. 
UNAHBIGUOUS LANGUAGE CANNOT BE VARIED 
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS TO THE INTENT 
OF THE PARTIES. THE COURT ERRED IN 
CONSIDERING THE INTENT OF THE DEVELOPER 







Point II • . . . • l!J 
WHETHER ANY PURCHASER OF A LOT IN THE 
SUBDIVISION RELIED ON ':'HE RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANT IS A 11A'l'EHIAL FACT, SHARPLY 
DISPUTED, THEHEBY lffiKING IT E~ROR FOR 
THE COURT TO GRANT SUMM..1\RY JlJDGIIENT. 
Point III . . . . lS 
SINCE PLAINTIFFS AD;UTTED T!!AT TilE 
RESTRIC'riVE COVENAIJ'r \/AS D'f MISTAKE i'ffi))E 
APPLICABLE 'l'O LOT l, 'l'HE COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO CONSIDER DEFENDA~TS' DEFENSE 
THAT REFORMATION OF TilE /1ISTJ\KE viAS BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LI'1ITl\TIONS AND SUI1HARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE JS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
THE TIME OF DISCOVERY OF THE MISTAKE IS 
IN DISPUTE. 
Point IV ... 
ZONING CANNOT SUPERSEDE COVEN~NT 
EESTJUCTION~) 
l 
. • . . • . 18 
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Point V ..••• 
TilE PLAT CANNOT CHANGE TilE TE:l<J.1S OF A 
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IN THE SUPRicHE COURT OF Tlii~ S'J'hTE Of' UT!d! 




C;,:c No. lGOG'J 
Jay B. Baldwin, Jr. et dl., 
Defendants dnd 
Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS-DEFENDANTS 
STI\TE11ENT OF THE: NATURE OF THE Ci\SE 
------~----------------- -------------
Plaintiffs, owners of Lot J in Mt. Olympus Subdivision 
in Salt Lake County, sued J class consisting of other lot 
owners in the subdivision, seeking a determination thal a 
covenant, restricting all lots in the subdivisior1 to resi-
dential use, did not apply to Lot 1 which plaintiffs were 
attempting to develop as a shopping center. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
Plaint i Efs moved for surundry j udgnent. I•fter orul 
subscc1uently granted plaintiffs' mot~on. The Co:Jrt entered 
ing, in brief, thut tnc restrictlve '~'Ovcnc>nt \'idS nr''JE:r 
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purchaser ever reasonably rc>li<:d ·on t 11<: coVc'nilnt dlld the~ t 
it would be unn?ctsonable to aPL)ly the rc:~;trictivc covcnanl 
to Lot J.. llctvincJ so ruled, the Court further dctcrDined 
that it WdS not nccc?SSctry to COilSidc'l clcfcnddnts' ctrqumcnt 
any attempt to reform the written covcnc~nt on yrounds of 
mistctkc is barred by the statute of limitations. 
RELIEF SOUt;l!'r em l\Pl'EiiL 
Defendants seek reversal of the su~nary iud~ment 
in favor of :JL,ittt.iffs ctnd il d0:clilr,,1 iJJn th,"t "umc1c~ry 
jud(jment wo.s n...._)t ~JrO~)l::>r h·~Cclu:-;;•_' ~n._-ttcl-lltJ fdcts are in 
dispute. In t,'" ,-Ltc:'rrwtivc, if tl1e t'ourt fincls thctt 
Judgment in their favor on qround:; tli<~t, as d mattc,r of 
STATEMJ.::~JT OF J',\C'i'S 
Plaintiffs are the owners of a five-dcrc'S lot lll 
the Nt. Olympu.; Subdivision in Sc~lt Liikc Countv. 'l'he 
subdivision 1vas oriqindlly developed in lCJ'lG b;' Gcn1ctrd P. 
of Wlilintiffs. 
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office, shows st.~~JC'r<J.l hund1c~cl -lols (1f :-jjJTI~ldc siz~_<l_nc1 
_,one larger tcn-,,cro lot-:" The LctCjCt lot is nuJ'lbcrecl Lot 
l and is marked "Commercial Zonc/Shoppinq Cc,nter." After 
the rlat WiJ.S rec()r__cl(Od, the Brockbank.; llud prepctred and 
-, 
recorded a restrictive covenant c:')VccincJ all lots in tm, 
subdivision (R. 114). The pertinent part of the covenant 
(R. 15) states: "All the lots in said tract shccd l be 
known and described as residentiill lots and shiJ.ll be used 
for residential purposes only." The covenant also specifically 
excepts certain enumerated lots from this restrlction; Lot 1 
is not so excepted. Nevertheless, in l9~h, Lot l was zoned 
-~ 
conunerc iaJ:.~-·-
Several years later Bernard and Nada Brockbank 
sold to the State approximately half cf Lot l when the 
State Road Commission threatened to condemn th8t part 
of Lot l which it needed for road expansion. TlK BrockbC~nk s 
later transferred the remaining five ctcre portion of Lot l 
to their sons, Loren and Von, 11ho \·lith their ·,;ives, are 
plaintiffs in this action. 
In 1971 the plaintiffs attempted to obtain finC~ncing 
from Zions Bank in Salt Lake City and proposed that Lot l 
be used to secure the loan ( R. 2 3 9 l . A title report dated 
September 7, 1971, was provided to the Bani< by Brockbank 
Realty and Brnckbdnk and Sons (R. 240)- The rt.p<Jrt 1r1dicdted 
- 3-
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thdt Lot 1 WdS subjc:ct to a rcstrir:tiV•' r:ovr•ndnt. 
Kiholm, an officer and employee of the· flilnk, called this 
fact to the attention of plaintiffs (H. 241)) dnd, because 
of this restriction, findncinq WdS rcfusrd. 
In 1975, plaintiffs attemrtcd to develop Lot 1 
cts"' shorring center, but were still unJ!llc to obtuin 
financing becaUSe' lending institutions rr~fusec] to fillc1!1Ce 
the project without a juclicial determincttion cts to Hl!cthcr 
the restrictive covendnt ctp!Jlied to Lot 1 (plctintiffs' 
complaint, R. 5). Therefore, }Jlaintiffs brought suit 
against the named defendants, property oHners in the sub-
division. It wus subsequently orclr•r•~·cl that the action 
be maintainecl ctS " ._:;_~,ss ctction ctCJdiW't all property owners 
in the subdivision (R. 52). 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the restrictive 
covenant was never intended to ·'1'1'1" dllcl dor_cs not dpply 
to Lot 1 (plaintiffs' cou1plaint, fircc;t CdUSC of action, 
R. 5). In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that if 
the coveni.lnt clOL'S ~•[Jply to Lot J, tl1c·n :>uch resulted from 
mistake or inauvertancc uncl thee cou1 t s!1ould orclcr rc·formn-
tion of the covcndnt to rcfloct tiH' true intent of tlte 
developers (plaintiffs' :occond Cc•IIS• of ,,ctJon, F. 7). 
Pldintiff~~; furtllc•r ctrqu"cl til .t- the pL.t, 1v:11ch 
was recorded first, should takcc j>ncc~ elL' liCe over tile rco;trlctive 
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covenant (third cause of action, R. 7), that the C-1 zoning 
clctssification should permit the dev<clopment of the shopping 
center despite the restrictive covenctnt (fourth cause 
of action, R. 8), that the restrictive covenant is against 
public policy (fifth and sixth causes of action, R. 10, and 
ll), and that the restrictive covenant is void (seventh 
cause of action, R. 12). 
Defendants answered with a general denial of most 
of the allegations in the complaint. In addition, defendants 
affirmatively alleged in their verified answer (R. 34) 
that virtually all of the defendants purchased their pro-
perty in reliance on the covenant, that plaintiffs had 
actual or constructive notice that the covenant restricted 
Lot l and that plaintiffs' request for reformation is 
barred by the statute of limitation, Utah Code 1\nnotated 
78-12-2G (3), which provides that an €,t9 for reforma~ 
c---
of f mistake must be_br_CJ_ugh~- witl~in three years of' the 
disc~~~;y- o-;-t~e- mistake.=-~-· 
1
! ,rL --0> t0 ~ -z;-
~-The C~~rt -~ran-t-~d plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment, ruling, as previously stated, that the restrictive 
covenant did not apply to Lot l. This holding was essentially 
a judgment on plaintiffs' first cause of action. Having 
so ruled, the Court determined that the plaintiffs' second 
cause of action for reformation of ~istake and defendants' 
-5-
I  
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statute of limitations dc:;fense was "v:ithout merit" 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 241) or was immaterial and that 
it was unnecessar~ to consider such defense (Conclusions 
of Law, R. 250). 
not argued. 
Plaintiffs' other Cduses of c1ction 1·1ere 
-~._)-
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POINT I 
UNAMBIGUOUS Ll\NCUl\GC Ci\;liJOT BE Vl\F\IED 
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE l\S TO THE INTENT 
OF TilE PARTIES. THr; COlJH'l' EEHED IN 
CONSIDERING THE INTENT OF THE DEVELOPER 
OF THE SUBDIVISION 
The language of the covenant clearly makes the 
residential restriction applica0le to Lot 1. The covenant 
states: "All the lots in said tract shall be known and 
described as residential lots and shall be used for residential 
purposes only" [emphasis added] . In addition, the covenant 
specifically excepts from this residential restriction 
certain lots, specifically named, which are earmarked for 
"school, Church and Recreational purposes." Lot 1 is not 
excepted, nor does the covenant make an1 mention of any 
lot in the subdivision being set aside for cor~ercial and/or 
shopping purposes. 
Given this unambiguous language, it is clear that 
the restrictive covenant was made applicable and is still 
applicable to Lot l. The clear and plain language makes 
it impossible to conclude otherwise. 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that despite this 
clear and unambiguous language, the covenant should be 
held inapplicable to Lot l because it was never intended 
-7-
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to be applied to Lot 1. Bernard Brockbctnk, in his dffidavit, 
states that he was the developer of the subdivision, that 
he cctused the plat and the covenants to be prepared and 
recorded and that it was never his intention that Lot 
1 was to be subject to the restrictive covenant (R. 114) 
But the developer's intention is immaterial where the 
language of the covenant is plain and unambiguous and 
evidence as to his intent cannot be used to vary terms 
which are clear and definite. 
v. B}air, 565 P.2d 776, Utah, 1977, there was a dispute 
as to what portion of leased property the lessor was 
obligated to set aside for parking spaces. The lease 
said parking was to be on "Lots 25 to 30" but the trial 
court ruled that the language was aniliiguous, considered 
evidence that the lessor did not intend that only Lots 25 
to 30 could be set aside for pdrking, and ruled in favor 
of the lessor. The Utah Supreme Court reversed saying: 
The rule in the State of Utah, as 
elsewhere, is that parol evidence 
may be admitted to show the intent 
of the parties if the language of 
a written contract is vague and 
uncertain. On the other hand, sue~ 
evidence cannot be permitted to vary 
or contradict the: plain Ltnrjuage 
of a contract ... If it wcts in fact 
the intention of the parties that 
the: parking arect could be: located 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
anywhere on the south half of the 
lessor's property, they had only 
to say so. To say now that the parties 
did not mean what they said in clear 
and plain language is to vary and 
contradict the terms of the contract. 
The Court rul12d the same way in Clyde_~~-~di!:l_<;!t0_£1_ 
fan_!:_l]c_£1_<;! _ _(:_~·· 10 Utah 2J 14, 347 P.2d 563 (1959) 
Under the clear language of the 
writing W8 are not impressed with 
[defendant's contention as to his 
intention], particularly since 
intentions cannot vary the terms 
of clear,concise, unambiguous language 
employed by him who says he did 
not intend what he said. 
371 P.2d 360 (1962), where the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that where language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no basis for interpreting it by showing by extraneous 
evidence the intent or understanding of a party. 
Plaintiffs rely on the rule as stated in Parrish v. 
Ri_<::_flard_~-' 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 (1959), that in 
the "construction of uncertain or ambiguous restrictions the 
courts will resolve all doubts in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of property." Defendants do not contest 
that proposition but such a rule has no bearing here as 
we are not attempting to interpret uncertain or ambiguous 
restrictions. "1'1here the langudqe of the restriction is 
clear and una~Jiguous, the parties will be confined to the 
-9-
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meaning of the language Hhich they huve employed, and it 
is unnecessary and improper to inqu1r~ into the surrounding 
circumstances or the obJects and purposes of the grant or 
restrictions for aid in its construction." 26 C.J.S., Deeds, 
Sec. 1G3, p. 1104. 
In light of the forec;oing, the court erred in 
considering the developer's intention Hhere the languac;e 
of the covenant Has clear, plain, definite and unambic;uous. 
POINT II 
WHETIIER ANY PURCHASER OF A LOT IN THE 
SUBDIVISION RELIED ON THE RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANT IS A lffiTE2IAL FACT, SHARPLY 
DISPI"T iT, TIIEREBY :1J1KING IT ERROR FOR 
THE COl FT TO GRANT Sm1~1ARY JUDGr-1ENT. 
In granting pliiintiffs' motion for sumrr.ary judgment, 
the trial court further ruled that no purchaser of any 
lot in the subdivision could have rel1ccl on the covenant or 
believed it restricted Lot l to residential usc. Whether 
any purchaser relied is an issue of L1ct thut is sharply 
disputed. 
Defendants filed tHo affiddvits of persons Hho 
had purchased lots in the subdivision. Each st·oted that 
he relied on the covenant when he purchdscd hioc lut. 
Earl Spafford, who purchased " lot in J ') r, 3 and 
later sold it, stated: "Thctt c1t the time' of sc1 i.d purchase 
-11-
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affiant was informed of and reliec1 upon the lanqu0ge of 
said restrictive covenant" (P.. 22()). Don Smlth, one of 
the defendants in the inst~nt action, stctted that, when 
he purchased his lot in 1972, he "exctmined the title report 
and the restrictive covenant contained therein" and further 
that he "knew of the restrictive covenant covered by [sic, 
presumably he meant covering] Lot l and relied thereon 
in his purchase of the property" (P.. 237). 
These statements are in direct conflict with the 
affidavit of Bernard Brockbank, who stated: "I do not 
know of any purchaser or owner of any of the lots in the 
subdivision who relied, in purchasing a lot or lots, on 
the restrictive covenant as restricting .... Lot 1 .... " 
(R. 117). 
Nevertheless,the court failed to recognize this 
dispute of fact and entered the following Finding of Fact: 
of Law: 
21. None of the purchasers, owners 
of, or any pe~son having any interest 
in any of the lots in the aforesaid 
subdivision ever reasonably relied 
in purchasing a lot or lots in said 
subdivision on the restrictive 
covenants as restricting ..• Lot 1 to 
noncommercial residontial development. 
(P.. 247). 
The court also entered the following Conclusions 
6. None of the purchasers, owners of, 
nor any person or entity having any 
interest of any kind whatsoever in any 
of the lots in the aforesaid subdivision 
-11-
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ever reasonably relied, in 
purchasing a lot or lots in said 
subdivisions, on the restrictive 
covenants as restricting ..• Lot l 
to noncommercial residential 
development. .. 
ll. There are no issues of fact 
raised by the affidavits or records 
herein .•. 
13. The affidavit of Eurl s. 
Spafford does not raise any issues 
of material fact and is deficient 
in setting forth any facts that Earl 
S. Spafford relied on the aforesaid 
restrictive covenant ... 
14. The affidavit of Don Smith does 
not raise any issues of material 
fact and is deficient in setting 
forth any facts that Don Smith 
relled on the aforesaid restrictive 
covenants ... (R. 250, 251). 
Clearly these Findings and Conclusions are not 
correct. Whether purchasers of lots relied on the covenant 
as being applicable to Lot l is sharply in dispute since 
the developer claims no one relied and two purchasers claim 
they relied. Therefore, sununary judgment is clearly in 
appropriate and the court erred in granting it. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rcpetcdly ruled that 
summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted 
only with reluctance and with great caution. 
~.!?."~.smda_co., 19 Utah 2c1 124, 427 P.2d 390 (l%7). 
This principle is stated oluinly 1n 
lvood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2ll 410 (lCJS'J): 
-12-
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Sununary judgment is " drcoStlc remedy 
and the Court should be rcluctctnt 
to deprive litigants of an opportunity 
to fully lc'rescnt their contentions 
upon a tried.. It should be qrantcd 
only when under the facts vi~wed in 
the light most favorable to [him against 
whom it is directed] he could not re-
cover as a I~tter of law. 
2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962): 
'l'o sustain a sununary judqment, the 
pleadings evidence, admissions, and 
inferences must show that there is 
not a genuine issue of motorial fact 
and that the winner is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of la1·1. Su,~lt 
showing must preclude, as a matter 
of law, all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could win if given 
a trial. 
The court apparently attempted to reconcile the 
disputed facts as to reliance by finding that there was 
no "reasonable" reliance. \Vhether the reliance clctimed 
by Mr. Smith and Mr. Spafford was re,;.iOnablc lS to be 
determined by a trier of fact; such is not d determination 
to be made on a motion for summary judgment and without 
any evidence dS to reasonableness. "It is not the purpose 
of the sun\!Tiary judgment procedure to j udgce the credibility 
of the ctverments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight 
of evidence .•. if there is any dispute as to any issue 
n:<.,terial to the: settlement of the controversy, the sununary 
judqment sh(Juld not bee 'Jrctntcd." 
542 P.2u 191, Utcth, ]975. 
l -
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The very fact thc~t the court 01 clc·rccl pL• in Lift 
to prepare Findings of Fact (R. 2,12) indicates t!1at t 11c 
court had indeed determined f ,,c t s. In considering a motie>n 
for summary judgment, it is not the judqc's role to find 
facts, but only to look ot th0 fucts ph:sented to hir1 
to determine if materiul fc1cts c1Hc lll cJj~;cJUtL'. Holbrook 
~~~dams, supra. 
Plaintiffs attempt to dis.crcclit f·lr. Smith's nnd 
Mr. Spafford's affidavits b~' aryuinlj that their st<~tCJ11cnts 
regctrclinlj tlkir knowledge of ancl rel iiince on the rcstri ct i ve 
covendnt aL·e not stcJtemcnts of L1ct hut unsubstc~ntiated 
conclusions '"'- 2l2 and 21,1). 
(1973), requires thclt sL1tc't1cnts s•. forth in an dffidavit 
"must be made on person,JL knohlL·c1qe of the: affinnt, dncl 
set forth facts that •.. siloh' tlL•t tJ1,. "ffiunt is compeL,nt: 
made by 1-lr. Smith and i'lr. Spc1fford \'''~rc; made: of tncir own 
personal knowledge iind belief. I-lr. Smith ctnd nr .. Spafford <-1rl? 
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Plai.ntiffs also attack Hr. Spc~fforrl's df1:idavrt 
as being imm,,terial and irrelev:.nt sine" Mr. Spafford 
is not a defendant in the case and presently owns no property 
in the subdivision. It matters not thc~t Hr. Spafford 
no longer owns property in the subdivision. :lr. Brockbctnk 
Sctid in his affidavit that he knew of no purchc~ser who 
had relied. Mr. Spafford is ci purchaser who did rely. 
Evidence is inunaterial and irrelevant only if it sheds 
no light on the question; convP.rsly, evidence is rtelevant 
if it tends to prove or disprovG a f:oct in is~:,w. 311, 
C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 138. Mr. Spafford's affidavi~ meets 
this criteria. If his ctffidavit is imm~tcri~l b~c~use 
he is not a defendant, then Bernard Brockbank's affidavit 
should be immaterial because he is not a plaint1ff. Such 
absurdity needs no elaboration. 
Point III 
SINCE PLAINTIFFS ADIH'l'TED THAT THE 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT \vAS flY ['1ISTAKE 
rlADE APPLICABLE TO LOT l, THE COURT 
ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER DEFE~DANTS' 
DEFENSE THAT REFORHATION OF TilE ~1ISTAKE 
WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND SU~'LM/',RY JUDG~1ENT ON Tl!E ISSuE 
IS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE TIME OF 
DISCOVERY OF THE MISTAKE IS IN DISPUTE. 
As shown in Point I, the clear ctnd unaiTibiguous 
lC~nquziCJ'- of the covenant makes the' restriction apolicable 
'l'llcrc'fore, onc.e fi'USt co:.•-::luclc either tbat the 
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covenant was intentionally made applicable to Lot l or 
the language maklny it applicable was a mistake. 
Plaintiffs make no contention that the covenant 
was intentionally applied to Lot l; rather, they repeatedly 
admit that a mistake was made. Sec the following admissions: 
l. " ... c-.ctid document [the restrictive 
covenant] by accident mistake and/or 
inadvertance failed to exclude Lot 
! ... "(plaintiffs' answers to inter-
rogatories, R. 104). 
2. "It was also never intended that 
the large ten-acre tract be marked 
'l' and in so indicating that on the 
[JL,t, a mistake was made" (Bernard 
Brockbank's affidavit, R. 114). 
"He first discovered that a mistake 
ildd been made in marking 'l' on the 
portion of the plat ... " (Loren Brockbank's 
affidavit, R. 118). See similar 
statements in the affidc1Vits of the 
other three plaintiffs on H. 12(), 
122 and 124. 
4. "The upshot is tlldt the mistake 
on the plat identifying this large 
ten acre parcel as Lot l arguably 
subjected that piece of pro~crty ... to 
the restrictive covenant." (Oral 
argument of plaintiffs' ctttorney, 
R. 302). 
5. "Now, Bernard Brockbank's affiduvit, 
your Honor, makes it very clear th, t 
there was d mistake t:1ctt \vas never 
intended ... there was a mistdke ... " 
(Oral argument of plaintiffs' dttorncy, 
R. 30 3). 
G. "Your !loner, it'c; simply our position 
on this motion that there l!us been 
d mistake made... (Oral flr<Jumcnt of 
plaintiffs' dttornc,,, ~t. 3rJ4). 
-lG-
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Pl~intiffs' admissions that a mistake was made 
is also an admission that the lanqu,!CJC of the covenant 
makes the restriction applic<~ble to Lot 1. If the coveni'tnt 
did not apply to Lot 1, there \vould be no redSOn to admit 
that a mlstake hdd been made. 
In light of these admissions that a mistake was 
made, defendants must be given the opportunity to present 
their defense that: the statute of limitations bars reformation 
of the covenant_. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-26(3) provides that 
an 8 for relief on the ground of mistake must be 
brought within three years. 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs knew about 
the mistake as early as September of 1971, five years 
before this action was instituted. James Kiholm, an officer 
~nd employee of Zions Bank,statcd in his affidavit that 
on or about September 20, 1971, he pointed out to plaintiffs 
that a restrictive covenant 0ncunbered Lot l (R. 240). 
A title report prepared in 1971 and furnished to Zions 
by plaintiffs also indicated the existence of the covenant 
(R. 221). 
In direct contradiction to these facts are statements 
in plaintiffs' affidavits that they did not discover that 
a mistake had been made until mid-1975 (E. 118, 120, 122, 124). 
-17-
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on the issue of mistctkc ~tnd the cl<:f,•r,se of the statute oi: 
limitcttions \vould be clearly impropc1. "This court has 
d consistant policy of r"solvinq doulJtc; in L1vor of permitting 
parties to hctvc their dcJ!' in court OJ< the merits of the 
1978. See also the cases citE'd unclcr Point II with reqarcl 
to the propriety of summcJry judgment. 
Po in l IV 
zo;" I NG ,~,\cUOr SUPERSEDE COVEtJ!\tJ'l' RES'l'RICTIONS. 
Despite the 1 ~mgudgc of the covenant making tile 
residentictl restriction applicable to Lot l, the pcopcrtj' 
was zoned commercial in l'·'ciS. Thj s rczonin9, h0 1:JCVcr, 
has no bearing on whether th<: c:OV<'ll«lit is c~ppl icc~b:,. to 
Lot 1. It is a bctsic rule of lctw thc~t c1 03oning ordinc~ncc' 
docs not impair restrictions on prupcrty c~rHl th,;t restrictive 
covenants remctin pctramount. 
302, 299 P.2d 774 (l9SG) 14G tlont. 
218, 404 P.2d 394 (l%S) 
353 P.2d 350 (l9GO); 20 Am.Jur. 2d, Covenants, Ccmclitions 
and Restrictions, Sec. 277. 
1970, presented ct situation :-;imiL,r to th0 instcJnt cc~se. 
-l 'l-
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restricting their property to residential usc, arguin~ 
that the property had been rezoned for business use. 
The Supreme Court upheld the lower cGurt' s ruling a<Jainst 
them: "However, it is \vell settled thut zoning ordinances 
cannot override, annul, abrogate or relieve land from 
building restrictions or covenants placed thereon." 
The proposition is laid out in 26 C.J.S., Deeds, 
Sec. 171 (2) 
A valid restriction on the use of real 
property is neither nullified nor super-
seded by the adoption or enactment of a 
zoning ordinance, nor is ths validity 
of the covenant thereby affected. Thus, 
the action of the zoning authorities of 
a city declaring land on a restricted 
area to be a business district does 
not have the effect of destroying the 
restrictive covenants ... 
To hold in the instant case that because of the 
commercial zoning the restrictive covenant is not up[llicablc 
to Lot l would be clearly against the accepted rule of 
law. 
POINT V 
THE PLAT CANNOT Clll\NGE TilE TERilS 
OF A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. 
The fact that the recorded plat of the subdivision 
shows Lot 1 marked "Commercial Zone/Shopping Cente:::-" 
LS not sufficient to destroy the covenant restricting 
all lots to residential usc. 
-:~-
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It is a well established priJJcjp,d of L~1v concc·rninq 
building contracts that if a conflict is found to "xist 
between the written contract ii11d tlH-' plc~ns or spcc_i fi-
cations, the lunCJUilge of the wrltt··ll contrc1ct cOJltrols, 
even if the contract specific .. dl~ iJ>c·nrporcttc•s til·" ulans 
and specifications. _!_1!_~ il n_cl_Ell_yjncc·_r i Il_'_J ___ & __ C'?_ns_t_~_uc:_t:jo_I1 
Co_~-' 240 U.S. 264, 3G S.Ct. 3iJ3, 60 L.Ed. 6JG (l'llG) 
The rule should be no different for a covenant 
and a plat, •'"l'·~·,-i,tlly ,,s here, lvlL•rc• the covcnunt was 
recorded after the plat. 
\•/here words of conveyance 1n u deed conflict with 
the plat, the deed controls. "[i.] rc•fcrence tc· a plat 
is for the purpose of description ctnd cannot be resorted 
to enlarge or diminish the effect of the words of conveyance 
in the dc=ed. " 26 C.J.S, Deeds, Sec. 101, p. 3'l'l. 
390, 61 S.E. 2d 818, 21 1\.L.P. 2cl l2'Jf, (l'J50), tnc deed 
refc-rn,d to a plat which inclice.Itcd ct builcl1nc: line' Gl feet 
from thc street. I3ut the rc~~;Lrictiv. __ , ~__:ovcndiJt ~;t.dtPd, 
- -------------------- - --
11 NO residenc~~ shclll be erecte.:d 011 dny lot nce1rcr ... lhdn 
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80 feet from the property li nc as shown by the plat." The 
court held that the reference 1n the plat must yield to 
the specific wording of the restrictive covenant. See 
also 20 Am.Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 
Sec. 179 and 268. 
CONCLUS IOL-J 
---------
The language of the restrictive covenant is plain, 
definite and unambiguous; the covenant restriction is clearly 
applicable to Lot 1. 
Despite this clear li,nguage, tl1e court found the 
covenant not applicable because it was never intended to 
be applicable to Lot 1 and because no purchaser ever relied 
on it. Such was in error because: 
(1) Parol evidence as to intent cannot be used to 
vary the terms of a writing which is clear and unambiguous. 
(2) The issue of reliance is in sharp dispute, thereby 
precluding summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs admitted that language making the covenant 
applicable to Lot 1 was a mistake. Defendants contend that 
the statute of limitations has run as more than three years 
have elapsed since plaintiffs discovered the mi~take, a 
contention plaintiffs' dispute. Since plaintiffs admit a 
mistake, it is error for the court to refuse to consider 
-21-
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the time of discovery of the mist~kc is disputed, summary 
judgment is improper. 
DATED this _LC:__ clay of l<ovembcr, 1978. 
~L~ __ t_[)jj ___________ _ 
BRUCE LI\VI\H DI1313 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I her,,), ,·certify 7:hat a copy of tile foregoinq to 
William T. Thurmcm, Sr., attorney for plaintiffs <~ncl 
respondents, at 501) Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84133, this __ -_: __ clay of Novc>JTtbcr, l97R. 
- -~~-~ 1_ _!_·_:.._ ______ . ____ _ 
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